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A few days ago, 27 retired judges of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal have issued
a statement concerning the judgment K 3/21 of 7 October 2021. We are both among
its signatories. With this article, we hope to contribute to the clarification of the false
statements contained in that judgment, its oral explanations and statements of
representatives of political authorities, regarding the difficult matters of coexistence
of Polish law and European Union law.
1. It is not true that the judgment of the
Constitutional Tribunal of 7 October 2021 was
issued in order to guarantee the supremacy of the
Constitution over EU law, since such a position of
the Constitution has been sufficiently established
in the previous case law of the Tribunal (in cases K
18/04, K 32/09, SK 45/09)
Membership in the European Union notwithstanding, the Constitution is the supreme
law of the Republic of Poland, according to Article 8 para. 1 of the Constitution
(judgments: K 18/04, K 32/09, SK 45/09).  In case K 18/04, it was held (and
judgment K 3/21 reiterated this point) that two autonomous legal orders exist side by
side in a Member State.  They interact and a potential conflict is not excluded.
According to judgment K 18/04, it is the duty of the authorities to take steps to avoid
a collision, in particular by interpreting the law. This interpretation should respect the
autonomy of the two legal orders to the maximum extent possible.
Under no circumstances should a conflict be resolved by:
– recognizing the supremacy of the EU norm over the constitutional norm;
– nor by replacing the constitutional norm with a Union norm;
– or by limiting the scope of the constitutional norm to the area not covered by the
regulation of Union law.
Next, as the Constitutional Tribunal has already stated in the judgment K 18/04, an
interpretation of internal law that is „friendly to European law“, eliminating a possible
conflict between Union and Polish law, could not:
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– lead to results that are contrary to the express wording of the constitutional norms;
– diminish the minimum guarantee functions performed by the Constitution. The
protection of individual rights and freedoms by the Constitution sets a minimum and
impassable threshold.
If the irremovable contradiction actually occurred – the constitutionally empowered
Polish organ(s), would have to decide:
– either to amend the Constitution,
– or to cause changes in the Union law,
– or on Poland’s withdrawal from the European Union.
These rules, already existing in the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Tribunal,
constitute a guarantee mechanism ensuring the supremacy of the Constitution of the
Republic of Poland.
Contrary to the assertions and assumptions made as the starting point in the
judgment K 3/21, EU law required neither in the past nor in the present any 
abrogation of the principles set forth above in judgments K 18/04 and K 32/09 and
SK 45/09.
The judgment K 3/21asserts that under the norms of the TEU:
– the organs of the European Union were to act beyond the limits of the
competences transferred by the Republic of Poland in the Treaties,
– the Constitution ceased to be the supreme law of the Republic of Poland, having
priority of validity and application,
– the Republic of Poland could not function as a sovereign and democratic state.
This is manifestly untrue. In particular, this cannot be inferred from Articles 1, 4 and
19(1)(2) TEU which, for that very reason, were found by the Constitutional Tribunal
to be inconsistent with the Polish Constitution. 
The ruling K 3/21 assumes a priori that there is an insurmountable contradiction
between the Polish Constitution and the challenged Article 19 para. 1 para. 2 TEU
(provision of remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in fields covered
by Union law). However, no effort was made to remove this alleged conflict through
interpretation. 
The aim of the proceedings before the Constitutional Tribunal was not to resolve
any existing, real, irremovable contradiction between the the standards of the Polish
Constitution on the one hand and those of EU law on the other. The real aim of
the judgment was to provide cover for ordinary national legislation in order to lower
the standard of judicial independence below the level required by both the Polish
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Constitution and EU law. In this way, the illusion of a contradiction between EU law
and the Polish Constitution was artificially created. 
2. It is not true that the judgment of the
Constitutional Tribunal of 7 October 2021 itself
falls within the competence of the Tribunal and is
consistent with the Constitution
The judgment K 3/21 declared the following provisions of the Treaty on European
Union unconstitutional: the first and second paragraphs of Article 1 in connection
with Article 4(3) and the second paragraph of Article 19(1) in connection with Article
2 and Article 4(3) TEU. The Constitutional Tribunal went beyond the scope of the
motion of the Prime Minister.  The ruling is of an interpretative nature: the application
of these provisions in the sense adopted by the CJEU would be unconstitutional.
However, the scope of adjudication in the case decided by the Constitutional
Tribunal is a matter of EU law, the final and binding interpretation of which is the
exclusive jurisdiction of the CJEU. The Constitutional Tribunal has not submitted any
preliminary questions to the CJEU, despite the fact that such an obligation arises
both from EU law (Article 267, third paragraph of the TFEU) as well as the earlier
case-law of the Constitutional Tribunal (SK 45/09). It should be emphasized that the
legal construction of preliminary references and judgments is, in the light of the case
law of the Constitutional Tribunal, consistent with the Constitution (see judgments of
the Constitutional Tribunal K 18/04, P 37/05).
3. It is not true that EU law and the previous case
law of the CJEU question or violate the supremacy
of the Constitution in the Polish legal order
4. It is not true that the CJEU requires Polish
courts to desist from observing and applying the
Constitution as the supreme law of the Republic
In none of the judgments concerning Poland, no matter if it’s infringement or referral
proceedings, has the CJEU held that Polish courts have an obligation not to apply
the Polish Constitution, or an obligation to derogate from its provisions. The CJEU
case law concerned the incompatibility of Polish laws (statutes) with EU law, such
as the Act on the Supreme Court, the Act on the National Council of the Judiciary,
the Law on the System of Common Courts, or the so-called muzzling act. The CJEU
has even supported the Polish courts in their efforts to restore the compatibility of
laws and practice with the Polish Constitution, e.g. with the principle of separation
of powers (Article 10), independence and autonomy of the judiciary (Article 173),
independence of the judiciary (Article 178), and the principle of the primacy of
international law, including EU law, in the event of conflict with laws (Article 91(2)
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and (3)). This effect of the CJEU case law is particularly important in view of the
failure of the current Constitutional Tribunal to protect the Constitution and the
resulting inadequate protection of human and civil rights.
Union law and the jurisprudence of the CJEU indicate the minimum and necessary
elements of effective judicial protection in fields covered by Union law. Without 
independent courts established in accordance with the law, judicial protection loses
its meaning and, at the same time, its ability to fulfil its role: safeguarding the Union
legal order and the rights of individuals under that law. Clearly, these requirements
cannot violate the Polish Constitution, which contains similar guarantees. For this
reason, they also cannot infringe the supremacy of the Constitution in the territory of
Poland.
5. It is not true that the application of EU law by
Polish courts cannot be reconciled with their
application of the Constitution
Polish law, including the Constitution, and European Union law are legal orders
based on identical axiological premises (as the Constitutional Tribunal stated in
its judgment SK 45/09). Up to 2016, the Constitutional Tribunal developed ways
to avoid conflicts between both. It also formulated the principles of support for
European integration and EU-friendly interpretation of the Constitution. As has
also been mentioned, in the event of an inconsistency between the norms of the
Constitution and those of Union law that cannot be eliminated through interpretation,
one of the ways to remove such inconsistency is to amend the Constitution. This is
what happened in 2006, when Article 55 of the Constitution was amended following
the judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal in case P 1/05 (the European Arrest
Warrant case). If the courts have doubts as to the interpretation of EU law they may,
and sometimes should, turn to the CJEU with preliminary references.
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6. It is not true that the questioning by EU
institutions of the breach by Polish statutes and
practice of their application of the principles of
independence of Polish judges, who also adjudicate
in the fields covered by Union law, goes beyond the
competence conferred on the European Union by
Article 90(1) of the Constitution
7. It is not true that European Union law and the
case-law of the CJEU encroach upon the regulation
of the organisation of justice in Poland, since the
defence of judicial independence is not part of the
organisation of justice
The organisation of the judiciary (types of jurisdiction, structure of courts, their
jurisdiction, procedures) does not fall within the competences transferred to the
European Union under Article 90(1) of the Constitution.
However, the scope of competence transferred to the European Union does include
the obligation of Member States to establish the remedies sufficient to ensure
effective legal protection in fields covered by Union law (Article 19(1), second
subparagraph, TEU). Furthermore, everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed
by the law of the Union are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a
tribunal (Article 47(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights).
Poland, like the other Member States, has transferred to the Union, and thus to the
CJEU, the competence to interpret the principle of effective legal (judicial) protection,
and to verify whether Member States are complying with their Treaty obligation to
provide it.
The independence of judges is a prerequisite and at the same time a fundamental
component of effective legal protection and the fundamental right to an effective
remedy before the courts. Judicial independence as a concept, and the criteria
determining it, are not in itself part of the ‚organisation of the judiciary‘ for which
Member States remain competent. The fact that the Polish courts are also courts
of the Union requires, by contrast, that the standard of judicial independence,
which is a guarantee of the independence of the judiciary, should be the common
denominator of the judiciary in the Member States. This means that the criteria
for determining whether the requirements for judicial independence are met may
be set out in CJEU case law.  CJEU rulings function as a protective mechanism
when interference by the national authorities can be qualified as excessive,
disproportionate, causing new threats or stripping the guarantee mechanisms of
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judicial independence of their substance. This type of action does not concern the
regulation of the organisation of the judiciary. 
8. It is not true that the judgment of the
Constitutional Tribunal of 7 October 2021 will be
able to produce legal effects other than exerting
pressure on the judicial activity of Polish judges and
threatening them with disciplinary proceedings
In the judgment in question, the Constitutional Tribunal ruled on the inconsistency
with the Constitution of the basic provisions of the TEU, as formulated by the
applicant – the Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland. It should be noted,
however, that such formulations are not reflected in the actual case law of the CJEU.
The judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal does not and cannot result in a change
of the provisions of the TEU, nor of the case-law of the CJEU, as this does not
depend on the Polish authorities.  Moreover, the  Tribunal ‘s interpretation of the
CJEU is not binding on the Polish courts. Only the CJEU is authorised to give a
binding interpretation of EU law (Art. 19(1) TEU, second sentence). However, it can
be expected (and feared) that the judgment in question will result in pressure being
exerted on Polish judges to understand EU law as interpreted by the Constitutional
Tribunal and to refuse to apply certain CJEU judgments. Judges could be threatened
through the disciplinary regime of the so-called Muzzle Law of 2019. The statutory
provisions providing that the content of rulings of judges of common courts can be
qualified as a disciplinary offence were deemed by the CJEU in judgment C 791/19
in breach of Article 19(1) of the TEU. However, this judgment has not yet been
implemented. Judges may also be threatened by administrative measures, such
as removing them from office and transferring them to another judicial department,
which are used for the same repressive purposes as the disciplinary mechanism.
The CJEU judgment in case C-487/19 also formulated requirements with respect
to proceedings leading to effects analogous to disciplinary proceedings. It should
be added that, in the light of judgment C-83/19, the entire disciplinary system is
dysfunctional.
9. It is not true that the Constitutional Tribunal has
the authority to review the constitutionality of CJEU
rulings and to decide whether Poland, as a Member
State, should selectively respect CJEU case law
The interpretative ruling in the K 3/21 judgment declares the application of the
reviewed provisions of the TEU unconstitutional in particular cases. This formula
of unconstitutionality is, in a way, an external facade: it conceals the fact that the
Constitutional Tribunal’s judgment undermines specific judgments of the CJEU. 
- 6 -
These are a  series of rulings defining the standard of effective legal protection on
the basis of Article 19 TEU.  However, CJEU judgments are final and binding within
the EU, and the principle is universal.
In the final part of the oral reasons for the ruling, the judge-rapporteur in case K 3/21
explicitly stated that the Tribunal does not rule out that in the future it will directly
review the constitutionality of the CJEU rulings, including removing them from the
Polish legal system. Such a declaration was also included in the communication
published by the Constitutional Tribunal after the judgment K 3/21.
Pursuant to the model of constitutional judicature adopted in Poland, the
Constitutional Tribunal does not, however, have the authority to review the
constitutionality of individual judicial decisions (argument from Article 188 of the
Constitution). This applies to Polish rulings, and even more so to rulings by a
supranational court such as the CJEU (additional arguments are provided by
Articles 9 and 90(1) of the Constitution, as well as by the earlier jurisprudence of the
Constitutional Tribunal, in particular the judgment K 18/04). 
10. It is not true that constitutional courts of
other Member States in matters concerning
relations between national law and EU law have
issued judgments similar to the one issued by the
Constitutional Tribunal on October 7, 2021.
On this issue in particular there are many distortions in the statements made by
politicians from the ruling coalition and some commentators.
Indeed, the constitutional courts of several Member States have issued judgments
in which they have taken a position different from that of the CJEU judgments.
However, this is still an exceptional phenomenon, and not a frequent one, as could
be inferred from the comments made by representatives of the ruling camp in
Poland. There are also fundamental differences in terms of substance.
Firstly, in none of the Member States other than Poland the principle of primacy
of EU law over national law has been generally questioned. On the contrary, the
jurisprudence of the constitutional courts clearly emphasises the validity of this
principle, even in the case of an exceptional departure from the CJEU jurisprudence.
Secondly, the judgments of the courts in other countries concerned strictly defined
contentious issues that arose in the interpretation of the domestic constitution and
EU law, mainly in particular areas of substantive law. These judgments related
primarily to secondary EU law and challenged neither the Treaties themselves (as
the K 3/21 judgment does) nor the CJEU’s jurisprudence on the very foundations
on which the Union is based, such as the obligation of Member States to provide
effective legal protection in fields covered by EU law and the resulting guarantees of
judicial independence.
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Thirdly, the judgments of the constitutional courts of other Member States have
generally served to raise the level of protection of citizens, whereas the judgment in
case K 3/21 lowers that level.
Fourthly, the divergences between the jurisprudence of the constitutional courts
of other Member States and the jurisprudence of the CJEU were of a temporary
nature and were usually eliminated as a result of changes in domestic law or its
interpretation.  They did not result in a Member State challenging their fundamental
duties of loyalty to the Union.
Fifthly, before the judgments in question were issued by constitutional courts of
other Member States, the CJEU had the opportunity to take a position by issuing
preliminary rulings.
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